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REDISH ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
Larry Alexander 
ABSTRACT—My contribution to this Festschrift for Marty Redish looks at 
two of his most important articles on freedom of speech, both published in 
1982. One article deals with free speech and advocacy of crime, while the 
other presents Marty’s general justificatory theory of freedom of speech. 
Although I agree and disagree with various parts of Marty’s analysis in the 
former, I am unpersuaded that Marty’s general theory can succeed either 
positively or normatively. Marty Redish is an important scholar in several 
domains, displaying enviable versatility as well as depth. Although he is 
perhaps the leading contemporary expositor of the law of federal 
jurisdiction, he is almost as important a figure in the vastly more crowded 
field in which his and my scholarship overlap. Redish on Freedom of 
Speech is my modest contribution to this richly deserved Festschrift. 
 
AUTHOR—Warren Distinguished Professor, University of San Diego 
School of Law. Thanks to the audience at the Festschrift for Marty Redish 
and to Marty himself for their comments. 
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I. REDISH ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE BASIC POSITIONS 
Marty Redish has written many articles and books on the topic of 
freedom of speech, but I believe his most important contributions to the 
topic were two contemporaneous articles that were published thirty years 
ago. In The Value of Free Speech,1 published in the University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, Redish sets forth his view of the basic justifying 
theory of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. And in 
Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment: In Defense of 
Clear and Present Danger,2 published in the California Law Review, 
Redish recounts the history of the treatment of illegal advocacy under the 
First Amendment from Schenck v. United States3 to Brandenburg v. Ohio4 
and offers his own view on what that treatment should be. 
In the Pennsylvania Law Review article, Redish argues that the basic 
value underlying freedom of speech is that of individual self-realization.5 It 
is the value that best explains First Amendment doctrine and best justifies 
the existence of that doctrine. According to Redish, all the values offered as 
alternatives to self-realization, such as democratic decisionmaking, 
ultimately derive from individual self-realization and thus presuppose it.6 
For example, the value of a democratic system of government rests 
ultimately on democracy’s contribution to individual self-realization, both 
intrinsically in allowing individuals to control their destinies and 
instrumentally in developing human faculties that themselves further self-
realization. Or so Redish argues.7 
In the California Law Review article, Redish examines the important 
and historically significant corner of free speech doctrine dealing with 
advocacy of illegal conduct. As can be ascertained from the article’s title, 
Redish endorses the clear and present danger test,8 though not necessarily 
 
1 Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982). 
2 Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment: In Defense of Clear 
and Present Danger, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1159 (1982). 
3 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
4 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
5 See Redish, supra note 1, at 593. 
6 See id. at 594. 
7 See id. at 602–04. 
8 That is, the speech advocating illegal conduct may be suppressed only when there exists a clear 
and present danger that unless the speech is suppressed, the illegal conduct will occur. 
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as it was first elaborated in Schenck9 or later elaborated in Brandenburg.10 
For example, Redish rejects the implication in Brandenburg that the 
speaker must intend the illegal conduct that his words advocate to be 
validly convicted despite a First Amendment plea in his defense.11 On the 
other hand, Redish would allow the speaker’s conviction only if his words 
directly, as opposed to indirectly, advocate the illegal conduct, which may 
or may not be consistent with Brandenburg.12 (I would argue that such a 
requirement is not a fair implication of Brandenburg.)13 
I do not believe Redish succeeds in making his case in either article. 
Because the article on illegal advocacy is a more localized failure, I shall 
take it up first. 
II. THE DILEMMA OF ADVOCACY OF ILLEGAL CONDUCT 
There are three approaches the law might take to speech that could stir 
an audience to commit crimes. First, the law could focus exclusively on the 
audience, punishing it and only it for any crimes or attempted crimes it 
commits as a result of having been stirred to do so by the speaker’s words. 
Second, the law might attempt, through either the threat of punishment 
or outright muzzling, to prevent the speaker from uttering the words (or 
employing other symbols) that might stir the audience to illegality. This 
approach would supplement the normal sanctions and threats thereof 
applied to the audience itself. This approach might merely apply the normal 
criminal law rules regarding solicitation and complicity, but it might go 
well beyond them to prevent the communication of words that might stir 
the audience to illegality. 
The first approach is obviously the most speech protective, while the 
second is not speech protective in the least. The third approach—or really 
family of approaches—would be to negotiate a course somewhere between 
the first and second approaches. That is where First Amendment doctrine 
has gone, from Schenck to Brandenburg, and Redish follows suit. 
Like all theoretically “impure” positions, this intermediate approach, 
representing a compromise between freedom of speech and the prevention 
of crimes, draws lines that seem unprincipled. Nonetheless, the two “pure” 
approaches are too extreme to countenance. The first, holding only the 
audience and not the speaker liable for any harms caused as a result of the 
speech, not only rules out garden-variety crimes and torts, such as 
solicitation and inducement of contractual breach, but also fails to deal with 
 
9 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
10 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). 
11 Redish, supra note 2, at 1178. 
12 Id. at 1178–79. But see id. at 1189 (invoking Marc Antony’s funeral oration to suggest that 
nonliteral advocacy be treated as “direct” advocacy). 
13 See infra notes 18–20 and accompanying text. 
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harms caused by audiences that cannot themselves be held responsible. 
That is so because any token of speech that might incite a legally and 
morally responsible person to commit a crime or tort might likewise incite 
a legally and morally nonresponsible person—for example, someone insane 
or below the age of responsibility. And the last position, which authorizes 
preventing all speech that might incite others to harmful actions, leaves 
freedom of speech completely impotent. 
Thus, the impure compromise positions are the only viable candidates 
for a regime that contains a meaningful right of free speech but that is not 
suicidal. The clear and present danger test, in its various iterations from 
Schenck to Brandenburg, is the compromise the Supreme Court has 
adopted to deal with inciting speech under the First Amendment. 
The Brandenburg test, which is the reigning test today and was when 
Redish wrote his article, is a one-sentence test with several components. 
The speech that is the potential basis for sanctioning the speaker must be 
“directed to” inciting unlawful acts.14 “Directed” implies that the speaker 
must have as his purpose inciting those acts. In other words, it implies a 
mens rea of intent. This is the one part of the Brandenburg test that Redish 
rejects,15 and he is right to do so. The criminal law is properly concerned 
with mens rea, but why should free speech law be concerned with it? Free 
speech law is concerned with the communication of ideas, not with 
retributive desert. Of course, eliminating mens rea altogether and focusing 
entirely on the causal potency of the speech might well have an in terrorem 
effect that chills too much valuable speech, but that can be largely avoided 
by requiring a mens rea of recklessness, an approach the Court itself took 
with respect to defamation of public officials.16 Requiring a mens rea of 
purpose serves no obvious free speech value. Nor is it consistent with the 
Court’s own approach to fighting words or to hostile audiences, neither of 
which require, as a precondition to sanctioning the speaker, that the speaker 
intend to provoke the audience to violence.17 
So Redish is on solid ground in criticizing the requirement of an 
intention to incite lawlessness. However, he is on shaky and, I would argue, 
inconsistent ground when he argues that the speaker’s words must directly 
advocate lawlessness as opposed to indirectly doing so.18 Although the 
distinction Redish attempts to draw is not entirely clear to me, I take it he 
 
14 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
15 Redish, supra note 2, at 1178. 
16 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
17 See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (hostile audience); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 
315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942) (fighting words). 
18 Redish, supra note 2, at 1178–79. 
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means that to be sanctionable, the speaker’s words must be literally words 
of incitement.19 But if that is what Redish intends, he is wrong to do so. 
The first point to stress is that language is a code, and like any code, 
its marks and sounds can symbolize anything. Of course, a successful code 
requires that the audience understand how to decode the marks and sounds 
so as to uncover the meaning that the author of the marks and sounds 
intended to convey. “Literal” meaning, if there is such a thing, can only 
refer to the meaning most audiences would attribute to a speaker who uses 
the terms whose meaning is in question. But if that is what literal meaning 
is, why should we care about it as opposed to the meaning the author 
intended, the meaning the audience would likely assume the author 
intended, or both? 
For example, suppose there is a revolutionary cell poised to commit 
acts of violence as soon as its leader gives the signal. And suppose its 
leader broadcasts, “The red fish swims at dawn.” In the code agreed to 
within the cell, “the red fish swims at dawn” translates into “blow up the 
hydroelectric plant today.” Its literal meaning—that is, its meaning to those 
unaware of the cell and its code—has something to do with the aquatic 
habits of brightly colored sea animals. But if the clear and present danger 
test is a limitation on freedom of speech for the purpose of squelching calls 
to lawless conduct, then “the red fish swims at dawn” is precisely the kind 
of speech that should be punishable under such a test. So, too, for “Brutus 
is an honorable man”20 and all other symbols that convey to an audience 
that the speaker is imploring them to commit unlawful acts. I doubt that the 
Brandenburg test requires that the speaker’s words directly—that is, 
literally—advocate illegal conduct. And Redish is wrong to argue that it 
should, as his distinction between direct and indirect advocacy implies. 
Brandenburg also requires that the speaker’s words be “likely to 
incite” the lawless action.21 Redish, too, endorses a likely to incite 
requirement.22 There are two issues I would like to raise with respect to this 
likelihood, apart from the obvious issue of how likely is “likely.” 
First, “likely” seems to imply an invariant probability threshold. When 
the likelihood of inciting lawless activity exceeds that threshold, the speech 
is sanctionable. If it falls short of that threshold, it is not. Compare this 
 
19 Redish’s apparent definition of indirect advocacy is “a statement which does not on its face urge 
unlawful conduct.” Id. at 1179 (emphasis added). Given that definition of indirect advocacy—and, by 
implication, of direct advocacy as well—I cannot see how Redish can reconcile his immunizing indirect 
advocacy with his quite correct analysis of the danger in immunizing Marc Antony’s funeral oration. Id. 
at 1189. 
20 Words attributed to Marc Antony by William Shakespeare on the occasion of Antony’s funeral 
oration at Julius Caesar’s burial. As portrayed by Shakespeare, Antony is attempting to stir the audience 
against Brutus and the other killers of Caesar through sarcasm. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS 
CAESAR act 3, sc. 2. 
21 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
22 Redish, supra note 2, at 1180. 
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invariant threshold approach with the Learned Hand approach taken by 
Justice Vinson in Dennis v. United States.23 Hand’s approach would require 
a lower probability for more serious harms than for less serious ones.24 In 
other words, Hand advocates a sliding scale of probability of lawlessness, 
requiring only a slight probability for lawless acts that cause catastrophic 
harms. Is not Hand’s approach the more sensible of the two? 
The second issue with respect to likelihood is whether likelihood is 
supposed to be calculated taking into account the fact that the authorities 
are monitoring the speaker, and perhaps the audience, and are aware of the 
incitement. After all, in many of the situations where incitement is 
prosecuted, the actual likelihood of the incitement leading to lawlessness is 
essentially zero given the authorities’ actions. So, are we to apply the test 
based on the actual likelihood that the speech will incite lawlessness? Or 
are we to do so based on how likely the speech was to incite violence had 
the authorities not been present? 
Note that in many prosecutions for criminal solicitation, the solicitor 
contracted with an undercover cop rather than an actual hit man. In such 
cases, the actual probability that the solicitation of murder would result in a 
murder was zero. Should these prosecutions be thrown out under 
Brandenburg? (Defense attorneys representing defendants charged with 
soliciting undercover cops posing as hit men: Don’t try a Brandenburg 
defense if you want to maintain credibility with the judge.) 
Redish rejects Kent Greenawalt’s attempt to distinguish, for First 
Amendment purposes, between ordinary criminal solicitations and more 
political incitements.25 I agree with Redish on this point. But if nonpolitical 
criminal solicitation prosecutions are okay even when the solicitee is quite 
unlikely to commit the crime, the same should be true when the solicitation 
is political. If the defendant walks into what he believes is a primed-to-
revolt meeting of radicals and shouts “Burn down the banks—now!,” he 
should be validly subject to prosecution under Brandenburg, even if those 
in the meeting are not radicals, as the speaker believed, but a meeting of 
bank executives in casual attire. 
I confess that I do not know how the Brandenburg Court meant for the 
likelihood component of its test to be applied—particularly, whether the 
likelihood threshold was to be invariant or was to vary with the harm 
feared, and whether the fact that the authorities are monitoring the situation 
is to be treated as an endogenous or as an exogenous factor in calculating 
the probability. Redish says little about this issue, but it is not one that can 
be elided in a theoretical account of the clear and present danger test. 
 
23 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) (plurality opinion). 
24 See United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), aff’d, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
25 See Redish, supra note 2, at 1163–64 (criticizing Kent Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 AM. 
BAR FOUND. RES. J. 645, 748–49). 
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Likewise, Redish says little about Brandenburg’s “imminence” 
component.26 I cannot see the relevance of imminence independent of its 
bearing on likelihood. Obviously, a speech that advocates lawless acts in 
the distant future is, others things being equal, less likely to lead to those 
acts than speech that advocates a lawless act in the next minute. That is not 
always true, of course, but it is generally true because the passage of time 
affords more opportunities to avert the lawless action and produces more 
changes in the circumstances that originally motivated the advocacy of that 
action. But if we hold the likelihood of lawless action constant, it is 
difficult to see why the fact that the lawless action will occur in the more 
rather than less distant future should matter. In other words, it is hard to see 
why imminence, as opposed to likelihood, matters at all. 
III. FREE SPEECH AND SELF-REALIZATION 
Redish claims that the principal value served by freedom of speech is 
individual self-realization.27 In so claiming, Redish shifts the focus from the 
interests of speakers—the focus of Edwin Baker’s free speech theory, for 
example28—to the interests of the audience.29 I believe Redish is right to do 
so. For surely the right of freedom of speech is implicated whenever 
government acts to prevent an audience from gaining access to a message, 
even if the speaker is a foreign national unprotected by the First 
Amendment, or is long dead or even nonexistent—as would be the case 
were government to prevent people from looking at marks made by ocean 
waves that government feared the audience would take to be a subversive 
message from God. 
But if freedom of speech is primarily a right of the audience, then why 
is it not violated when nongovernmental actors—private citizens—refuse to 
convey messages to the audience for the very same censorious reasons that 
free speech condemns when government is muzzling the speaker? Is not the 
audience’s self-realization stymied equally by those who muzzle 
themselves as by the government’s muzzling? On the other hand, we are 
always muzzling ourselves or, if speaking, editing what we say. A right of 
free speech against self-muzzlers is a complete nonstarter. 
If audience self-realization runs into difficulties with self-muzzlers, its 
difficulties have only just begun. For as I have written elsewhere,30 all 
incidental regulations of speech—all regulations that are not aimed at the 
messages being conveyed but only at the means and resources necessary 
 
26 What he does say is critical of any imminence requirement and implies that he would be 
sympathetic to my folding the temporal issue into the likelihood inquiry. See id. at 1180–82. 
27 Redish, supra note 1, at 593. 
28 See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964 
(1978). 
29 See Redish, supra note 1, at 620–21. 
30 LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? 13–37 (2005). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
600 
for their conveyance—have speech effects. That is, all incidental 
regulations of speech affect what gets said, by whom, to whom, and with 
what effect. And such incidental regulations include not just time, place, 
and manner regulations of speech, but the laws of property, contracts, torts, 
labor, the environment, welfare, taxation, and crimes—all laws! For every 
part of the corpus juris has speech effects, and the entire corpus juris has 
immense, incalculable speech effects, dwarfing the speech effects of laws 
aimed specifically at the content of messages. That means, therefore, that 
the information any of us possesses to enable our self-realization is hostage 
to the state of the entire corpus juris. Moreover, any alternative corpus 
juris will have different but no less significant speech effects. And there is 
no Archimedean point from which to evaluate these alternative speech 
effects, even assuming we could calculate them. For any such evaluation 
would require the evaluator—the courts, an arm of the government—to 
decide what information people should have, which is the antithesis of any 
conception of freedom of speech. 
If the value of self-realization were not sufficiently jeopardized by the 
impotency of a right of free speech that leaves self-muzzling and incidental 
regulations of speech untouched—as Redish appears to do—things get no 
better when the focus is narrowed to regulations based on the content of 
speech, the messages conveyed. Content regulations should be at the heart 
of any plausible free speech theory, but can the value of self-realization 
adequately justify plausible doctrines dealing with content regulations? I 
am extremely skeptical. 
I like to divide content regulations into two broad categories based on 
how the message that government wishes to interdict can cause the harm 
that the government is concerned to prevent. In one large category are laws 
aimed at messages that cause harm in one step. That is, once the audience 
receives the message, either the harm has occurred or the harm will occur 
through processes that the government cannot control or prohibit. This 
category includes laws protecting secrets, privacy, confidentiality, property 
in messages (copyright, trademark), and reputation; laws protecting persons 
from deception, from threats and other forms of coercion, and from offense 
and emotional trauma; and laws aimed at messages that might incite 
nonresponsible actors (the insane, the young) to commit harmful acts. 
Messages can, once received by an audience, cause these harms and 
others that at that point the government is powerless to prevent. How 
should the value of self-realization affect our attitude towards content 
regulations aimed at preventing these one-step harms? I cannot see how 
analysis of these laws is advanced by positing self-realization as the 
guiding value. 
First, the value of self-realization is on both sides of the equation. If 
the law prevents me from knowing the content of, say, a lawyer–client 
confidential communication, my ability to intelligently assess and pursue 
my goals may be deleteriously affected. On the other hand, the failure to 
107:593 (2013) Redish on Freedom of Speech 
601 
legally protect the confidentiality of lawyer–client communications may 
deleteriously affect the self-realization of lawyers’ clients. The same point 
can be made with respect to content regulations that protect privacy, 
reputation, or property. Indeed, the point applies to all these one-step-harm 
content regulations. 
Second, given that self-realization appears on both sides of the 
equation, self-realization cannot generate a verdict on a content regulation 
without balancing its effects on both sides against each other. But such a 
balance will require the court—an arm of government—to decide just how 
valuable the tokens of proscribed speech are to the audience that the law 
deprives of those tokens. Just how important is it for members of the public 
to learn that a celebrity has a sixth toe, etc.? Such a query will thus require 
the government to violate evaluative neutrality, the heart of all conceptions 
of freedom of speech. 
Redish does think that the value of self-realization can be “balanced” 
against the harms content regulations are meant to prevent.31 But again, this 
seems to ignore that weighing competing self-realization interests will 
involve a court making judgments about various messages’ value—the 
antithesis of the governmental evaluative neutrality at the heart of freedom 
of speech. 
Matters get no better for self-realization when we turn to content 
regulations predicated on preventing harms that the messages produce in 
two steps. The first step is the communication of the message to the 
audience. The second is the audience committing proscribable harmful acts. 
The significant difference between one-step and two-step harms produced 
by the content of messages is that the government has the option with two-
step harms of focusing entirely on the second step and leaving the first step, 
the communication of the message, entirely unregulated. This is not an 
option with one-step harms, when the government can only prevent the 
harms by preventing the communication of the messages. 
Content regulations aimed at two-step harms, such as laws aimed at 
illegal solicitation and advocacy, fighting words, hostile audiences, 
criminal “cookbooks,” and so on, are the domain that looks most fertile for 
a robust deontological right of free speech. Thomas Scanlon and David 
Strauss have produced free speech theories that focus on two-step harms.32 
Nonetheless, I have argued that such theories cannot succeed, not only 
because audiences for inciting speech will always include those too insane 
or too young to be held responsible,33 but more fundamentally because no 
tenable line can be drawn between speech advocating wrongful acts and 
 
31 See Redish, supra note 1, at 623–25. 
32 See Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204 (1972); 
David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334 (1991). 
33 Which means that government can only prevent the harm by threatening the speaker, the 
audience being beyond government’s ability legitimately to threaten. 
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speech that is harmfully deceptive—and there can be no right to deceive 
others.34 
Redish himself, unlike Scanlon and Strauss, does not take an absolutist 
approach to inciting speech.35 (Scanlon later abandoned his absolutist 
approach.)36 But once an absolutist approach is off the table, we are left 
with balancing and the intractable problem of evaluative neutrality. Self-
realization will not be helpful, as again, it is on both sides of the balance. 
 
 
34 If the advocate of law violation is urging a wrongful act but is claiming that the act is not 
wrongful, the advocate is being deceptive and is no different from one who makes false and defamatory 
statements. Any incorrect value claim will contain some incorrect factual claim, even if only by 
implication. The full argument for this can be found in ALEXANDER, supra note 30, at 70–79. 
35 See Redish, supra note 1, at 623–25. 
36 See T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 
519 (1979). 
